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Abstract
This note relates the mechanisms that are based on mediated contracts of Rahman
and Obara (2010) to the mechanisms of Myerson (1982). It shows that the mechanisms
in Myerson (1982) are more general in that they encompass the mechanisms based on
mediated contracts. It establishes an equivalence between the two classes if mediated
contracts are allowed to be stochastic.
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1 Introduction
In an inspiring paper, Rahman and Obara (2010) introduce the concept of mediated contracts.1
The authors clearly show that, in team problems with balanced budgets, mediated contracts
outperform standard, non–mediated ones and even enable a virtual implementation of the first
best. What remains less clear is how their concept of mediation relates to other concepts of
mediation in earlier work on mechanism design (e.g., Myerson 1986, 1991, Forges 1986). This
note tries to clarify this link by contrasting mediated contracts to the mechanisms of Myerson
(1982), who extends the revelation principle to settings with moral hazard.2 It argues that the
∗Humboldt-Universita¨t zu Berlin, Institute for Microeconomic Theory, Spandauer Str. 1, D-10178 Berlin
(Germany), strauszr@wiwi.hu-berlin.de. I thank Andrea Attar, Helmut Bester, Francoise Forges, Daniel
Kra¨hmer, Johannes Mu¨nster, and David Rahman for very helpful discussions.
1See also Rahman (2009) for the use of mediated contracts in a monitoring context.
2Both Myerson (1982) and Rahman and Obara (2010) allow, next to moral hazard, also for ex ante private
information, but because the conceptual difference relates to the moral hazard problem, this notes focuses on
the moral hazard and abstracts from ex ante private information.
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mechanisms in Myerson encompass the mechanisms based on mediated contracts and are more
general in that they allow for a larger degree of randomization. An equivalence between the
two classes of mechanisms obtains if one extends mediated contracts to stochastic mediated
contracts that also condition on purely random signals. The equivalence implies that there is
no loss of generality in restricting attention to incentive compatible mediated contracts in the
sense of Rahman and Obara (2010) if such contracts are allowed to be stochastic.
2 Setup
I illustrate my arguments in a version of Holmstro¨m (1982)’s seminal moral hazard in teams
problem. There are two agents who each have to pick an effort level e ∈ R+.
3 The cost of effort
is c(e) = e2/2. The output’s value is linear in effort: y(e1, e2) = e1 + e2. Agents are identical
and have the quasi–linear utility function
u(t, e) = t− c(e),
where t represents a monetary transfer. In this quasi–linear framework, the Pareto efficient pair
of effort levels (e∗1, e
∗
2) is unique. It maximizes y(e1, e2)− c(e1)− c(e2) and exhibits e
∗
1 = e
∗
2 = 1.
When effort levels are unobservable, the agents cannot implement the efficient effort levels
directly. When output is observable, agents can however write binding contracts how to share
the proceeds from the final output. These contracts induce a simultaneous move game in which
the two agents each pick an effort level non–cooperatively. Holmstro¨m (1982) shows however
that there does not exist a contract pair (t1(y), t2(y)) that satisfies the budget balance condition
t1(y) + t2(y) = y
and induces a simultaneous move game with a Nash–equilibrium in which the agents pick the
efficient effort levels e∗1 = e
∗
2 = 1.
3To circumvent measure theoretical complications, Rahman and Obara (2010) derive their formal results for
finite action spaces, but this example shows their construction works just as well with infinite action spaces.
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3 Mediated Contracts
Rahman and Obara (2010) extend the concept of a contract to mediated contracts by introduc-
ing a mediator. In line with earlier literature, the mediator merely facilitates communication
between the two agents; he gives only non–binding recommendations about effort levels. The
new idea of Rahman and Obara (2010) is to condition the contract on the mediator’s rec-
ommendations.4 Hence, the contract no longer conditions transfers only on the output level,
but also on the mediator’s recommendations. In the Holmstro¨m example above, this means
that, instead of ti(y), contracts are expressed by ti(y, e
r
1, e
r
2) where e
r
i represents the mediator’s
recommendation to agent i.
The timing with mediated contracts is as follows: First, the agents agree on some mediated
contract pair (t1(y, e
r
1, e
r
2), t2(y, e
r
1, e
r
2)) and a probability distribution over effort pairs (e1, e2).
The mediator then draws an effort pair (er1, e
r
2) according to this pre–specified distribution
and reports to each agent i the drawn effort level eri as a confidential recommendation. Only
knowing their own recommendation, the two agents choose their effort levels simultaneously.
Finally, the chosen effort levels result in a final output y and leads to transfers according to the
pre–determined contract pair (t1(y, e
r
1, e
r
2), t2(y, e
r
1, e
r
2)). Rahman and Obara (2010) consider
mediated contracts that balance the budget and are Bayes’ incentive compatible in the sense
that each agent has an incentive to follow the recommendation if the other agent follows the
recommendation.
In order to illustrate the power of mediated contracts in the Holmstro¨m framework, consider
the following specific one. With probability 1 − ε the mediator recommends each agent the
efficient effort level: (er1, e
r
2) = (1, 1). With probability ε/2 the mediator recommends agent
1 the efficient effort level and agent 2 to shirk: (er1, e
r
2) = (1, 0). Finally, with probability
ε/2 the mediator recommends agent 1 to shirk and agent 2 to work efficiently: (er1, e
r
2) =
(0, 1). Crucially, recommendations are given confidentially so that when agent i receives the
recommendation eri = 1, he is unsure about the recommendation e
r
j of the other agent j 6=
i. He, however, knows the probability distribution according to which the mediator gives
4The recommendations, therefore, need to be verifiable, but this seems unproblematic: The mediator writes
each recommendation on a piece of paper and sends each piece of paper to the respective agent. After the
output occurs, agents are obliged to reveal the pieces of paper publicly.
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recommendations. Using Bayes’ rule, agent i, therefore, expects that erj = 0 with probability
µ0 = Pr{e
j = 0|ei = 1} =
ε/2
1− ε+ ε/2
=
ε
2− ε
and erj = 1 with probability
µ1 = Pr{e
j = 1|ei = 1} = 1− µ0 =
2− 2ε
2− ε
.
In addition, let the contract depend on the recommendation (er1, e
r
2) as follows. For any
pair of recommendations the output is shared equally, except for the recommendation (1, 0)
and (0, 1). For these two special cases, the agent who is given the recommendation to work
efficiently (er = 1) receives 1/ε times the output as a transfer, whereas the agent who is told
to shirk (er = 0) receives the (negative) transfer (ε− 1)y/ε. Formally,
t1(y, e
r
1, e
r
2) =


y/ε, if (er1, e
r
2) = (1, 0),
(ε− 1)y/ε, if (er1, e
r
2) = (0, 1),
y/2, otherwise;
t2(y, e
r
1, e
r
2) =


(ε− 1)y/ε, if (er1, e
r
2) = (1, 0),
y/ε, if (er1, e
r
2) = (0, 1),
y/2, otherwise.
By construction, the contract’s budget is balanced.
The transfer schedule together with the mediator’s probability distribution over recommen-
dations is Bayes’ incentive compatible: First, given a recommendation to shirk eri = 0, agent
i is certain that agent j 6= i has received the recommendation erj = 1 so that agent i expects
a negative transfer (ε − 1)y/ε from the output y. Given these expectations, it is a dominant
strategy to follow the mediator’s recommendation eri = 0. Alternatively, given the recommen-
dation eri = 1, agent i believes that agent j 6= i received and follows the recommendation e
r
j = 0
with probability µ0 and the recommendation e
r
j = 1 with probability µ1. In the former case,
his effort level ei yields him a transfer ei/ε. In the latter case, the effort level ei yields him a
transfer (1 + ei)/2. Hence, his expected utility from an effort level ei is
µ0ei/ε+ (1− µ0)(1 + ei)/2− e
2
i /2 =
1− ε
2− ε
+ ei − e
2
i /2.
Clearly, ei = 1 maximizes this expression so that it is a best response for agent i to follow the
recommendation eri = 1.
Because, for any ε ∈ (0, 1) the corresponding mediated contract implements the efficient
effort choices e1 = e2 = 1 with probability 1−ε, the mediated contract virtually implements the
efficient outcome as ε approaches 0. This result contrasts sharply with Holmstro¨m’s inefficiency
result and demonstrates the power of mediated contracts.
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4 Mechanism Design
The literature on communication and mechanism design has noted the beneficial role of medi-
ators in implementation problems before. In particular, Myerson (1982) introduces a mediator
in a simultaneous move game with moral hazard.5 Similar to Rahman and Obara (2010), the
mediator in Myerson makes confidential recommendations before the agents make their choices.
In contrast, Myerson does not capture contractual commitments by a formal contract, but by
the way the mediator is “programmed” to choose among the contractible variables.
In the context of the Holmstro¨m model, the contractible variable is the pair of conditional
transfer schedules (t1(y), t2(y)). Hence, Myerson’s interpretation is that the mediator chooses
the recommendations and the transfer schedules, but the picked transfer schedules are revealed
only after the agents have chosen their effort levels. The mechanism describes exactly how
the mediator is to pick the recommendations and the pair of conditional transfer schedules
(t1(y), t2(y)). This reveals the main conceptual difference between the two frameworks: In
Myerson (1982), a mechanism is a probability distribution over the combination of both recom-
mendations and the pairs of conditional transfer schedules (t1(y), t2(y)). In Rahman and Obara
(2010), a mechanism is a specific pair of mediated transfer schedules (t1(y, e
r
1, e
r
2), t2(y, e
r
1, e
r
2))
and a probability distribution over only the recommendations.6
Hence, Myerson’s framework seems, on the one hand, more general, because the mediator
randomizes over both recommendations and pairs of conditional transfer schedules, whereas
Rahman and Obara (2010) allow only randomizations over recommendations. On the other
hand, Myerson’s framework seems less general, because it allows only transfer schedules that
condition on output, whereas Rahman and Obara (2010) allow transfer schedules that condition
also on the mediator’s recommendations.
Note however that the second suggestion is misleading. Myerson explicitly allows the me-
diator to randomize over combinations of recommendations and contracts. This, in particular,
allows correlation between random draws of recommendations and random draws of transfer
schedules. As a consequence, one can, for any mechanism in the framework of Rahman and
5See also Forges (1986) and Myerson (1986), (1991).
6When the action set of the agents is finite but transfers are non–countable, the definition of a mechanism
in Rahman and Obara (2010) is, from a measure theoretical viewpoint, simpler than Myerson’s view, because
Myerson’s definition also allows mixing over transfers.
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Obara, find an equivalent one in the Myerson framework. In the specific example considered
above, the equivalent mechanism in the sense of Myerson is a mediator who mixes over the
three combinations (er1, e
r
2, t1, t2) = (1, 1, y/2, y/2), (e
r
1, e
r
2, t1, t2) = (1, 0, y/ε, (ε − 1)y/ε), and
(er1, e
r
2, t1, t2) = (0, 1, (ε− 1)y/ε, y/ε) with the respective probabilities 1− ε, ε/2, and ε/2.
Considering the question whether the Myerson framework is more general, note that me-
diated contracts as defined in Rahman and Obara (2010) do not allow for transfer schedules
that, conditional on the recommendation (er1, e
r
2), are random. In contrast, Myerson explicitly
allows for this.7 Because Rahman and Obara (2010) consider a quasi–linear framework, where
all agents are risk neutral with respect to transfers, this distinction does not matter. Any
transfer schedule that, conditional on the recommendation, is random can be replaced by a
deterministic transfer schedule that corresponds to its expected value. This does neither affect
the agent’s utilities nor the balanced budget constraint.
Rasmusen (1987), however, shows that, in teams with risk averse agents, Pareto efficient
allocations are implementable, but this requires random transfers off–the–equilibrium. Because
mechanisms in the sense of Rahman and Obara (2010) cannot capture such random transfers,
whereas the mechanisms in the sense of Myerson (1982) can, the mechanisms of Rahman and
Obara are, in the setup of Rasmusen (1987), suboptimal in comparison to Myerson.8
A straightforward remedy to the suboptimality is to consider stochastic mediated contracts
that, in addition to recommendations, can also condition on a purely random signal.9 This re-
sults in a class of mechanisms that is equivalent to Myerson (1982) in that there is a one–to–one
correspondence between the two. Stochastic mediated contracts are, therefore, an alternative
representation of the mechanisms in Myerson (1982).
7It is for this reason that, as noted in footnote 6, mechanisms in the sense of Rahman and Obara are simpler
constructs.
8I thank Johannes Mu¨nster for pointing out that, with risk aversion, it is even not clear if mediated contracts
allow a virtual implementation of Pareto efficient allocations. E.g., the above construction in Holmstro¨m’s
framework allows an implementation of the efficient effort levels with a probability arbitrarily close to one, but
with an unbounded variance in the agents’ utility.
9For stochastic mediated contracts see also Rahman (2005).
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5 Conclusion
Mechanisms based on stochastic mediated contracts are formally equivalent to the mechanisms
in Myerson (1982). They have, however, two interpretational advantages. First, they make more
explicit the correlation between the mediator’s recommendations and contract choice. Second,
they seem more natural, because the contract choice is explicitly left to the economic agents
and the mediator is limited to providing only recommendations. This representation is also
closer to the fundamental idea of agency theory that contracts are used to provide incentives.
Moreover, because Myerson (1982) derives his class of mechanisms from a revelation principle,
the equivalence further implies that there is no loss of generality in restricting attention to
incentive compatible mediated contracts in the sense of Rahman and Obara (2010) if such
contracts are allowed to be stochastic.
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